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Water has a “hybrid” nature, meaning it is co-produced by a variety of social 
processes, which, in turn, are also shaped by the physical hydrology of water. Thus, 
drought is far more complex than merely the number of gallons of water in an aquifer, 
and our understanding of it needs to be decentered from hydrology. This research is a 
case study of an extensive water project in La Libertad, Peru, known as Chavimochic, 
in an effort to determine what factors (other than hydrology) influence allocation of 
water. The primary research question asked: Do capital-intensive water projects like 
Chavimochic actually further exacerbate power inequalities as protectionists argue, and 
if so, how do the interplay of the various forces driving Chavimochic and the resulting 
asparagus industry, affect Chavimochic’s ability to relieve rural poverty? The role 
politics plays in influencing water projects is widely acknowledged, and was found to 
be a factor in Peru as well. Additionally, the study argues that three factors have been 
undervalued and overlooked in understanding equitable water distribution: land 
holdings, technology, and labor dynamics. 
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 Introduction 
 
“The Drought Isn’t Going Away. What You Can Do” reads the headline of a 
New York Times article from October of 2016—the middle of the most severe drought 
California has experienced in the last century.1 Analysis using NASA satellite data 
estimates that California’s aquifers are so over-exploited that it would take 11 trillion 
gallons to replenish them—around 1.5 times the largest reservoir in the United States.2 
Governor Jerry Brown declared the drought a state of emergency two years prior, in 
January of 2014, and only recently ended it in April 2017. “Take shorter showers,” the 
article plead, “reuse wastewater” and “improve efficiency”—the age old classics of 
water conservation. While these domestic-oriented, quick-fixes did reduce California’s 
water use by more than 22 percent between 2015 and 2017, such advice overshadows 
systemic issues which shape the politics of drought far more than household practices. 
Droughts are a fundamental characteristic of the arid climate; as Zilberman et al. (2014) 
note, “California is basically a desert state that invented itself by water.”3 Nonetheless, 
the state is America’s largest agricultural producer and allocates 80 percent of their total 
water supply to the agricultural sector.4  
Peru, too, devotes 80 percent of their water resources to the agricultural sector, 
despite the fact that its most densely cultivated regions are arid deserts much like 
                                                      
1 Daniel Griffin and Kevin J. Anchukaitis, "How Unusual Is the 2012-2014 California 
Drought?," Geophysical Research Letters 41, no. 24 (2014); Mike McPhate, "California Today: 
The Drought Isn't Going Away. What You Can Do.," The New York Times 2016. 
2 NASA, "Nasa Analysis: 11 Trillion Gallons to Replenish California Drought Losses," 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration  (2014). 
3 David Zilberman et al., "Individual and Institutional Responses to the Drought: The Case of 
California Agriculture," Contemporary Water Research and Education 121, no. 1 (2011). 
4 Ibid. 
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southern California.5 In an effort to expand farmland and increase productivity, Peru 
began an extensive irrigation project in the coastal region of La Libertad in 1986. The 
project, though not yet finished, has created an economic boom in the region by 
providing jobs, electricity, potable water, and irrigation to over 74,000 hectares. Yet, 
improved access to water has not entirely won the region’s fight against drought nor 
poverty. This is because access (or lack of access) to water is not merely a product of 
environmental processes, of precipitation and temperatures; rather, water availability is 
actively shaped by human consumption patterns and political ideologies.  
Water has a “hybrid” nature, meaning it is co-produced by a variety of social 
processes, which, in turn, are also shaped by the physical hydrology of water.6 Thus, 
drought is far more complex than merely the number of gallons of water in an aquifer, 
and our understanding of it needs to be decentered from hydrology. A growing body of 
literature has recognized this “hybrid nature” of water and thus emphasized the need to 
address underlying power dynamics such as political and economic influences in order 
to understand not only drought, but also equitable water distribution in general.7 While 
                                                      
5 Douglas Olson, "Recursos Hídricos," in Peru: La Oportunidad De Un País Diferente: 
Próspero, Equitativo Y Gobernable (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006). 
6 Jessica Budds and Leonith Hinojosa, "Restructuring and Rescaling Water Governance in 
Mining Contexts: The Co-Production of Waterscapes in Peru," Water Alternatives 5, no. 1 
(2012); Mark Carey et al., "Toward Hydro-Social Modeling: Mergin Human Variables and the 
Social Sciences with Climate-Glacier Runoff Models (Santa River, Peru)," Hydrology 518 
(2014). 
7 Rutgerd Boelens and Jeroen Vos, "The Danger of Naturalizing Water Policy Concepts: Water 
Productivity and Efficiency Discourses from Field Irrigation to Virtual Water Trade," 
Agricultural Water Management 108 (2012); Budds and Hinojosa; Jeffery Bury et al., "New 
Geographies of Water and Climate Change in Peru: Coupled Natural and Social 
Transformations in the Santa River Watershed," Association of American Geographers 2, no. 
103 (2013); Carey et al; Barbara Lynch, "Can the Technocrats Calm Peru's Troubled Waters?," 
NACLA Report on the Americas 47, no. 4 (2015); Lyla Mehta, "Water and Human 
Development: Capabilities, Entitlements and Power," in Background Paper for the 2006 Human 
Development Report 'Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis'. (New 
York: United Nations Development Programme, 2006); Erik Swyngedouw, "Modernity and 
 
 
3 
these two factors are integral to understanding water distribution, three factors have 
been undervalued and overlooked: land holdings, labor supply, and infrastructure. In 
order to understand how these three factors play a role in water distribution, section one 
describes the case study, problem and research questions. Section two lays the 
analytical framework for the study by illustrating the ways in which politics and, of 
course, hydrological processes determine water policies. Section three delves into the 
three more nuanced determinants of land holdings, technology, and labor supply, with 
regard specifically to the case study. Lastly, the discussion addresses how these three 
factors can deepen our understanding of not only agriculture in arid regions, but of 
equitable water distribution especially in times of drought. 
Case Study: La Libertad, Peru 
The Chavimochic water project in Peru functions as a case study through which 
to illustrate how land holdings, technology, and labor supply impact water availability 
and distribution, especially in times of scarcity. The immense irrigation project, known 
as Chavimochic, spans more than 280 kilometers along the north-western coast of La 
Libertad. The project diverts water from the Santa River, which runs along the southern 
Ancash-Libertad boarder, via the mother canal to pipe water northward into four 
valleys: Chao, Virú, Moche, and Chicama (hence the name Cha-Vi-Mo-Chic).8 Each of 
these valleys is sustained by their own respective rivers and agriculture has been present 
                                                                                                                                                              
Hybridity: Nature, Regeneracionismo, and the Production of the Spanish Waterscape 1890-
1930," Association of American Geographers 89, no. 3 (1999); Social Power and the 
Urbanization of Water: Flows of Power (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004); "Power, Water and Money: Exploring the Nexus," United Nations Development Report 
Background Paper 14 (2006); "The Political Economy and Political Ecology of the Hydro-
Social Cycle," Contemporary Water Research and Education, no. 142 (2009). 
8 See Figure 1. 
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along these river channels for millennium. Nonetheless, Peruvian engineers and 
agriculturists had dreamt of turning the sand and scrubs outside these traditional valleys 
into productive farmland as far back as 1910.9 The region is prone to floods and 
droughts due to El Niño and support for the project fluctuated along with the droughts. 
For example, in the summer of 1985, one year before the project officially began 
construction, the region was hit with a severe drought which limited irrigation in the 
four valleys of Chao, Virú, Moche, and Chicama. The Trujillo-based newspaper, La 
Industria, noted that during this drought the Chicama river flowed at only 24.2 cubic 
meters—225.6 cubic meters less than the previous year at the same time—which 
reduced agricultural productivity approximately fifty percent.10 Conversely, in the 
winter of 1985, despite the oncoming drought, the city of Chimbote was flooded from 
irrigation overflow in the Santa district—a direct consequence of water 
mismanagement.11 The floods, like previous natural floods from El Niño, increased 
malaria outbreaks and other water-borne diseases since the standing water attracted 
mosquito hatchings, thus turning an environmental crisis into a public health crisis as 
well.12 As a response, editorials in La Industria expressed support for Chavimochic as a 
way to regulate water flow and mitigate the most severe impacts of droughts. Humberto 
Landeras Rodriguez wrote: “With faith and hope we can fight together [as La Libertad 
                                                      
9 Mark Carey, "Watering the Desert, Feeding the Revolution: Velasco's Influence on Water Law 
and Agriculture on Peru's North-Central Coast (Chavimochic)," in The Peculiar Revolution: 
Rethinking the Peruvian Experiment under Military Rule, ed. Carlos Aguirre and Paulo Drinot 
(Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 2017). 
10 La Industria, "Aguas de ríos no alcanzan para riego de las tierras," La Industria 3 March 
1985. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Luis Chuquipoma Muñoz, "Detectan 38 casos en valle Chicama," La Industria 1985. 
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citizens] for a great economic transformation which the region badly needs via this 
important irrigation project [Chavimochic].”13 
Though the project was officially designated funding in 1980 (US $300 million 
over the course of twelve years), construction did not begin until 1986, urged on by 
droughts and water mismanagement.14 Construction was divided into three primary 
phases: Phase I and II planned to improve or newly irrigate over 46,000 hectares in the 
valleys of Chao, Virú, and Moche; Phase III plans to improve or newly irrigate an 
additionally 63,000 hectares and construct the Palo Redondo Dam in an effort to further 
reduce natural variability and regulate water supply.15 The first two phases concluded in 
the mid-1990s, while Phase III began in 2013 and is still underway as of 2017.  
Such massive land expansion facilitated La Libertad’s transition from a region 
of sugarcane haciendas and smallholder farmers, to industrial, export-oriented 
agricultural production. In fact, prior to the construction of Chavimochic, La Libertad 
exported an average of $45 million a year in agricultural products, which has since risen 
to over $550 million annually.16 Asparagus has become a dominant crop in the region 
due to favorable environmental conditions and high international demand. As a non-
traditional crop, it was a rarity on Peruvian farms when construction of Chavimochic 
began: the nation as a whole produced roughly 17,000 tons in 1986, but within ten 
                                                      
13 Humberto Landeras Rodriguez, "Sequia en el norte y el Proyecto Chavimochic," La Industria 
20 December 1958. 
14 El Presidente de la República, "Ejecutarán Proyecto Hidroenergético Chao Virú, Moche Y 
Chicama," Decreto Ley N. 22945  (1980). 
15 Proyecto Especial Chavimochic, "Infografia De Proyecto Chavimochic - III Etapa," 
ProInversión. 
16 "Boletín No. 86 Año X," Oficina de Relaciones Públicas  (2011). 
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years, production increased 86% to over 127,000 tons.17 Today, Peru is the world’s top 
exporter of fresh and preserved asparagus, of which, 51% is grown in La Libertad.18 
 
Problem 
While asparagus production generated a revenue of over $411 million dollars in 
2013, the largest 50 companies shared 95 percent of the export value, thus effectively 
concentrating the wealth in the hands of agro-industrialists.19 Chavimochic reports 
typically state that their main goals are to: a) increase irrigation, which, in turn, will b) 
increase agricultural production and specifically agro-industrial exportation, which, 
subsequently, will c) boost economic productivity and raise the standard of living for 
inhabitants of the entire region. Specifically, Chavimochic’s 2012 report published by 
the lead engineer, José Murgia Zannier, firstly emphasizes the need to expand irrigation 
and agro-industrial exports and lastly adds, as almost a side-thought or even a as a 
consequence of the agro-industry, that the project aims to “improve the living 
conditions of the inhabitants in the urban and rural sectors of the Region La Libertad.”20 
In short, improving the living conditions and reducing poverty in the region relies on 
the assumption that the wealth generated by the largest agro-industrial corporations will 
trickle down to the reset of the population.  
Even the original plans from the 1960s were heavily biased toward favoring 
economic productivity at the expense of equity. James Kus, in his 1987 study, argues 
                                                      
17 Food and Agriculture Organization, "FAOSTAT: Crops Visualize Data," FAO. 
18 Ministerio de Agricultura y Riego, "El Sector Agrario Del Esparragos," Ministerio de 
Agricultura y Riego. 
19 Luz Días Rios, "Agro-Industries Characterization and Appraisal: Asparagus in Peru," Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, no. 23 (2007). 
20 José Murgia Zannier, "Proyecto Especial Chavimochic," Gobierno Regional de La Libertad,  
(2012). 
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that the original vision of Chavimochic in 1961, as drafted by the Santa Corporation, 
was specifically designed to “benefit the elites of the region by improving the supply of 
water available to the large sugar estates and by the creation of many new latifundias in 
the new agricultural zones. The small farmer…was relegated to marginal lands in the 
Santa Corporation’s version of the project.”21 Later that year the plan was reviewed by 
American engineering company Radar and Associates to determine the necessity and 
feasibility of the preliminary plans. Radar and Associates concluded that the project was 
of “extreme importance” and should be immediately funded by loans from U.S. sources 
on the condition that the mechanization of large farms (rather than small ones) would be 
the priority:  
“While there is probably a need for small farms, it is our view that the real hope 
of efficient production and the improvement of the living standard of the area 
lies in the mechanization of the farms ....The smallest farm that can be 
efficiently mechanized is about 28 hectares. However, with this equipment the 
same farmer can efficiently farm 50 hectares. The next larger mechanized 
operation requires a minimum farm of about 41 hectares, but will be more 
efficiently operated with 100 hectares except in those areas of steep slopes 
where small farms of 6 1/2 to 10 hectares will be provided.”22 
 
In this sense, Radar and Associates and the Santa Corporation were correct: large, 
mechanized farms are far more productive than small ones. In fact, it is Peru’s continual 
progress toward large, mechanized farms that permitted them to become the largest 
asparagus exporters in the world: Peru’s yields (as of 2014) are 1.5 times greater than 
their closest competitor, Mexico, and nearly 4 times greater than the world average.23  
Back in 2003, the director of the water project, José León Rivera, emphasized this need 
for privatization in order to increase productivity: “within the third phase…we have 
                                                      
21 James S. Kus, "Chavimochic: A Peruvian Irrigation Project," Conference of Latin 
Americanist Geographers 13, no. 1 (1987). 
22 Ibid. 
23 Food and Agriculture Organization.; See Figure 3. 
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55,000 hectares of land, but only 7,000 hectares are actually cultivated. This is a great 
shame.”24 He goes on to suggest that in order to increase productivity, not only does 
Chavimochic need to expand irrigation, but the regional and federal government also 
need to legally support private investments and increase security for private owners. 
Similarly, the Union de Banco International expressed their continued support of the 
project in 2003 by saying that “the solution to the socioeconomic problems of the region 
depends, directly, on the immediate implementation of the irrigation project 
Chavimochic.”25 Thus, Chavimochic itself relies on the principles of trickle-down 
economics in order to distribute wealth throughout the region—which is inherently 
problematic since trickle-down economics has repeatedly proven to be an ineffective 
way to alleviate poverty.  
The emphasis on economic and agricultural productivity overshadows issues of 
social justice and the subtleties associated with water distribution by focusing on a 
select few corporations or elite individuals in the hopes that benefits will trickle down to 
the rest of the population. For example, Chavimochic reports that they have benefited 
more than 166,000 families to date by providing potable water, jobs, and electricity—all 
of which have raised the standard of living in the region.26 Yet groups such as peasant 
farmers and the landless poor, who have been traditionally marginalized, continue to be 
disadvantaged. In short, while Chavimochic has brought undeniable benefits to the 
region, it has done so within the framework of preexisting power dynamics, thus 
                                                      
24 José León Rivera, "Se debe ampliar frontera agrícola para el Proyecto," La Industria 3 August 
2003. 
25 Eduardo León Legendre, "Chavimochic: responsibilidad de todos los Liberteños," ibid. 7 
August 2003. 
26 Chavimochic, "Chavimochic En Cifras 2000-2010," Trujillo: Gobierno Regional La Libertad  
(2012). 
 
 
9 
replicating and even exacerbating inequalities in some situations. The wealth and 
prosperity that the project claims to have generated for the region has not been equitably 
distributed via the trickle-down effect. Instead, who is included as a beneficiary of the 
water project depends in part on land holdings, technology, and labor supply since they 
impact how users experience water distribution and the associated benefits.  
 
Research Questions  
Do capital-intensive water projects like Chavimochic actually further exacerbate 
power inequalities as protectionists argue? If so, how do the interplay of the various 
forces driving Chavimochic and the resulting asparagus industry—which at some points 
are a conflict between state-directed projects and neoliberal privatization—affect 
Chavimochic’s ability to relieve rural poverty? 
 
Methods 
 
This study draws on primary sources such as the Food and Agriculture database, 
World Bank reports, legal documents produced by the Peruvian government, 
newsletters from Chavimochic, the water project, and archived newspapers from Peru, 
in order to understand how the variety of forces have shaped the project. Secondary 
sources were drawn on to build the analytical foundation for understanding water as 
more than a physical process, and to reconstruct some of the social impacts of the 
project.  
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The Traditional Lens 
 
1. Environment 
 
Of course, water is a hydrological process—asparagus cannot be grown in a 
desert without it—but the role of hydrology needs to be decentered from understanding 
water policy, access, and distribution. Peru perfectly exemplifies the fact that human 
water use—more than physical availability—determines water access: it has more fresh 
water per capita than anywhere else in South America, yet is the continent’s most 
water-stressed country.27 Such a dichotomy supports the idea that water availability is 
not solely dependent on physical hydrological processes, but rather co-produced 
through social and political institutions that determine distribution. In fact, Mehta 
(2006) argues that water scarcity is not a natural phenomenon, but rather is “generated 
through socio-political processes, through exclusions, biases, discrimination.”28 
Granted, Mehta acknowledges that physical scarcity can and does exist, but it is not the 
only form of scarcity, nor even the most common. She defines three other categories: 
economic scarcity occurs when infrastructure is poorly managed and distributed; 
adaptive-capacity scarcity is driven by overconsumption and wasteful practices; and 
lastly, scarcity arising through socio-political processes is a product of distribution 
inequalities.29 Peru specifically, has experienced all four forms of water scarcity. To 
name just a few examples, Chavimochic was undertaken in an effort to reduce physical 
scarcity; the project was then opened up to the private sector and decentralized in order 
to improve efficiency and resolve economic scarcity; industrial agriculturists were 
                                                      
27 Olson; Anthony Bebbington and Mark Williams, "Water and Mining Conflicts in Peru," 
Mountain Research and Development 28, no. 3 (2008). 
28 Mehta. 
29 Ibid. 
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favored over smallholders for water allocation as a way to minimize waste and resolve 
adaptive-capacity scarcity; and lastly, land titling and the designation of water blocks 
was undertaken to minimize socio-political scarcity by redistributing resources. Since 
the ways in which water is used and perceived in everyday contexts varies greatly from 
that of a spiritual life-force to an economic good, it a difficult item to commodify. Thus, 
the term “waterscape” was proposed by Budds and Hinojosa (2012) in an effort to 
encapsulate water in terms of all its social, political, economic, and cross-temporal 
factors, rather than merely physical characteristics.30  
 
2. Politics  
In December of 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York filed a criminal suit against the Brazilian corporation Odebrecht for violating 
international corruption laws by paying hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes to 
officials in at least eleven countries.31 The U.S. Department of Justice found that by 
2006 the corporation had created an entire budget devoted solely to bribes, which they 
referred to as the “Division of Structured Operations” and ran via an independent 
computer server and offshore bank accounts.32 Odebrecht plead guilty to criminal 
                                                      
30 Budds and Hinojosa. 
31 United States District Court Eastern District of New York, Robert L. Capers, and Andrew 
Weissmann, "United States of America against Odebrecht S.A.," Title 18, Sections 371 and 
3551 et seq. Cr. No. 16-643 (2016). 
32 United States Department of Justice, "Obebrecht and Braskem Plead Guilty and Agree to Pay 
at Least $3.5 Billion in Global Penalties to Resolve Largest Foreign Bribery Case in History," 
Office of Public Affairs  (2016). 
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charges and agreed to pay between $2.6 and 4.5 billion—making it the largest 
anticorruption settlement in history.33  
In Peru specifically, Odebrecht has a long history of involvement in various 
sectors, which began in 1988 when the corporation was awarded a concessions 
agreement in conjunction with Peruvian construction firm Graña y Moreno, and the 
Peruvian government to begin work on a national water project known as 
Chavimochic.34 In conjunction with the federal government, the first two phases were 
mostly completed by the late 1990s, and bidding reopened for concessions for the third 
and final phase of the water project.35 In December of 2013 Odebrecht and Graña y 
Moreno—registered as Río Santa Consortium—won the bid once again and agreed to 
co-finance the project by contributing US $341 million dollars of the estimated $715 
needed to complete the project.36 The bid, which beat out European firms like Avengoa 
and Mota-Engil, comes as no surprise considering that Odebrecht recently plead guilty 
to paying $29 million in bribes to Peruvian officials between 2005 and 2014.37 And the 
bribery goes back even further. Peruvian investigative journalist Melissa Pérez 
Huaringa found evidence that Odebrecht did, in fact, resort to bribery to win the first 
                                                      
33 United States District Court Eastern District of New York, "Plea Agreement United States of 
America against Odebrecht S.A.," Cr. No. 16-643  (December 2016); Nicholas Casey and 
Andrea Zarate, "Corruption Scandals with Brazilian Roots Cascade across Latin America," The 
New York Times 2017. 
34 Graña y Montero, "Annual Report,"  (2008): 28. 
35 Gobierno Regional de La Libertad, "Chavimochic Tercera Etapa Primera Fase: Informe Sobre 
Estudios Del Proyecto Y Gestiones Realizadas Entre 2007 Y 2008 Para Obtener La Declaratoria 
De Viabilidad," Unidad Ejecutora 005 SNIP 90449 (2008). 
36 Agencia de Promoción de la Inversión Privada and Gobierno Regional de La Libertad, 
"Contrato De Concesión: Diseño, Construcción, Operación Y Mantenimiento De Las Obras 
Hidráulicas Mayores Del Proyecto Chavimochic," Comité Prointegración de Proinversión 1 
(2013); Renato Mostacero Plasencia, "Proyecto Especial Hidroenergético Chao-Virú-Moche-
Chicama (Chavimochic)," Gobeirno Regional de La Libertad, Trujillo (2013). 
37 Proyecto Especial Chavimochic, "Empresas Internacionales Interesadas En Iii Etapa 
Chavimochic," Boletín Informativo del Proyecto Especial Chavimochic Año XII 109 (2013); 
United States District Court Eastern District of New York. 
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concession for Chavimochic in 1988 as well.38 Checks show that Odebrecht paid Jorge 
Ramos Roncero (then-President Alan García’s uncle and the lead financer for the 
APRA political party) $1.8 million for “Proyecto Chavimochic” (see figure 2). And he 
was just one. Checks written from Odebrecht’s “Division of Structured Operations” 
show 530 Peruvian recipients over the course of the years—all under aliases. Even 
former President Toledo has been accused of accepting $35 million in bribes during his 
presidency (2001-2006), which has provoked a Federal Judge in Lima to issue his arrest 
warrant.39 Other than a tweet on February 12, 2017, proclaiming his innocence, Toledo 
has been in hiding. 
As for Chavimochic, work halted indefinitely in December of 2016 as the 
government considered revoking Odebrecht’s contract. In a statement to the press, the 
corporation conceded that, “we will respect the decision of the government and if it is 
necessary we will sell off all our concessions,” thus validating whatever decision the 
government comes to.40 Amid investigations and contract negotiations, current 
President Kuczynski conceded that while he is “completely against corruption, not 
everything that Odebrecht has done in Peru is corrupt,” which holds a grain of truth.41 
Chavimochic would not have been possible without their investments; thousands of 
hectares of land would still be uncultivated desert, the city of Trujillo would have 
limited access to potable water, and thousands of individuals would be unemployed. 
                                                      
38 Melissa Pérez Huaringa, "Odebrecht Pagó Coimas En El Perú Desde 1988 Por Los Proyectos 
Charcani V Y Chavimochic," Gran Angular 2017. 
39 Casey and Zarate. 
40 Julio Lira Segura, "Odebrecht Paraliza Construcción De Chavimochic Y Exige a Region La 
Libertad Adenda Por Us $100 Millones," Gestión February 2017. 
41 La República, "PPK sobre obras de Odebrecht: ‘No todo lo que hizo en el Perú es corrupto’" 
La República 2016. 
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Thus, as serious as this scandal is, it is not exceedingly surprising considering that the 
influential role politics plays in water policies globally is widely acknowledged. 
For example, Eric Swyngendouw (2004; 2006) argues that access to, or 
exclusion from, water is primarily determined by power dynamics—whether they be 
economic, social, or political, though the spheres of influence often overlap.42 Bridges 
and Perreault (2009) go so far as to argue that “environmental governance is a concept 
more popular than precise,” by which they mean that environmental issues are 
inherently driven by socio-political agendas.43 In fact, politics influences most 
environmental policies, not just water. For example, Piers Blaikie uses soil conservation 
policy to show that environmental issues and social systems are intimately interwoven 
in his book, The Political Economy of Soil Erosion.44 Since environmental policies such 
as soil conservation are political-economic issues which reflect a definite set of 
assumptions, he argues, “the state is not neutral and cannot necessarily solve soil 
erosion problems rationally or impartially…there are always winners and losers in 
erosion and conservation.”45 Similarly, Helen Ingram, argues in her book Water 
Politics: Change and Continuity, capital-intensive water projects have clearly defined 
“winners” and “losers,” based on political and economic power structures.46 Ingram 
characterizes case studies of water projects in the American Southwest into two 
categories of state-directed and decentralized, and found that while the beneficiaries 
                                                      
42 Swyngedouw, "Power, Water and Money: Exploring the Nexus."; Social Power and the 
Urbanization of Water: Flows of Power. 
43 Gavin Bridge and Tom Perreault, "Environmental Governance," in A Companion to 
Environmental Geography, ed. N. Castree, et al. (London, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009). 
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differ slightly between the two types of projects, the “losers” remain the same: the rural 
poor, indigenous populations, and often the environment. Thus, capital-intensive water 
projects serve to further exacerbate preexisting power inequalities by favoring the 
distribution of water among groups with political and economic power. “Policy design,” 
Ingram concludes, “matters much less to outcomes than policy analysts suppose. The 
capacity of dominant interests to pursue advantages despite changes in decision making 
appears to be large.”47 Historian Donald Worster even goes so far as to argue that the 
capital-intensive water projects of the American West inhibited democracy by 
concentrating power and wealth in the hands of the elite.48  
In short, water policies do not exist as neutral concepts: they are the result of 
particular political ideologies which prioritize certain water users and uses over others. 
While the recognition of political forces is vitally important in understanding water 
access, it is not the only determining factor. The acknowledgment of the influential role 
politics plays in capital-intensive water projects—whether it be as explicit as bribery or 
subtle as biased legislation—answers the first part of my research question: capital-
intensive water projects such as Chavimochic reproduce existing power inequalities. 
Nonetheless, the extent to which they exacerbate power inequalities is determined in 
part by often overlooked factors such as land holdings, technology and infrastructure, 
and labor supply. 
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The Three Key Factors of Water Distribution 
 
1. Land 
Land ownership in Peru, like many agrarian countries, has historically created a 
power dynamic with large private land owners residing at the top of the hierarchy and 
the landless poor at the bottom. Even though urban migration has increased in recent 
years, nearly a quarter of Peru’s population still lives in rural areas, of which 74% live 
below the national poverty line and rely on land as their primary resource, highlighting 
the fact that access to land is still a key factor to reducing poverty.49 Yet land without 
water, or water without land, has far less impact on reducing poverty. As Zwarteveen 
and Boelens (2014) note, “in arid and semi-arid regions the wealth differences between 
farmers increasingly are as much or more a function of people’s differential access to 
water as they are of differential access to land.”50 Such is the case in Peru: in 1985 
Chavimochic engineer Haya de la Torre wrote that the problem in cities is “work or 
death”; in rural areas the problem was once “land or death” but has more recently 
become “water or death.”51 Land, of course is imperative to individual’s livelihoods in 
agrarian societies—but land without water, especially in a desert, means nothing. As 
intensity of agricultural productivity increases in Peru, so too does tension over land and 
water rights—especially in rural areas where poverty is most widespread. 
Therefore, one of Chavimochic’s goals is to “improve the living conditions of 
the inhabitants of in the urban and rural sectors of the Region La Libertad” by providing 
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access to water for rural populations.52 Yet, realization of this goal is often undermined 
by policies favoring large land holdings over smallholders. In fact, almost none of the 
54,000 hectares of newly irrigated land has ended up in the hands of small farmers.53 
Instead, 86% of the land is concentrated between 11 agro-industrial companies—one of 
which, Camposol, owns 23% of the land in the region (more than 10,000 hectares).54 
Even in the traditional valleys where small farmers have subsided for millennia, many 
have sold their land to large producers in the face of economic pressures. Thus, while 
Chavimochic reports that they have created more than 65,000 jobs and benefitted 
roughly 166,000 families, not all of these benefits have reached the rural poor of La 
Libertad as intended—and even when they do, the benefits are not distributed equally 
by any means.55 In short, Chavimochic has improved the standard of living and relieved 
poverty in many situations via trickle-down economics, but has not done so uniformly 
nor comprehensively primarily because of unequal land distribution.   
 
Chavimochic Antecedents 
Distribution of such a valuable resource as land has been a political issue for 
decades: the Peruvian government has tried to redistribute and formalize land titles no 
less than twenty-two times since the Spanish conquest.56 The most well-known land 
reform—and one of the most comprehensive in Latin America—occurred under 
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General Juan Velasco Alvarado in 1969 in an effort to more equitably redistribute 
arable land. Even though Chavimochic was not implemented by the Velasco 
administration, the agrarian reform of 1969 paved the way for its construction twenty 
years later by changing the power dynamics of land ownership, and ultimately, 
centralizing control.  
In the first half of the 20th century, large hacienda (plantation) owners controlled 
roughly 70% of the nation’s agricultural land yet comprised merely 0.2 percent of the 
population, while small farmers represented 83 percent of the population but held only 6 
percent of arable land.57 In an effort to more equitably redistribute land—and power 
dynamics—Velasco expropriated 7.8 million hectares of land from corporations and 
hacienda owners and transformed them into Agricultural Production Cooperatives 
(APCs), which were typically owned collectively by former estate employees.58 The 
coastal region was particularly transformed from a region dominated by sugarcane 
estates to APCs. In fact, some of the first estates to be affected were Cartavio and Casa 
Grande sugarcane plantations in the Chicama Valley.59 Under the new agrarian law, 
corporations were prohibited from possessing agricultural lands entirely, and private 
individuals could own no more than 150 hectares.  
The communal ownership of land did not, however, necessarily benefit the rural 
poor as intended. Firstly, it excluded migrant workers and since the cooperatives were 
comprised of former hacienda employees, the actual number of rural poor remained 
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largely fixed.60 Wages, too, often dropped since prices for agricultural goods were 
regulated by the government. Rojas Senisse (1989) notes that sugar workers in the 
Chicama Valley saw a 74 percent decrease in their average pay between 1973 and 
1978.61 Secondly, cooperatives were indebted to the state upon their creation; the State 
agreed to pay former land owners 50 percent the value of their expropriated land, but 
the cost was assumed by the cooperatives themselves rather than the State.62 If a 
cooperative did not pay annual fees to reduce their debt, the Reform included a 
provision which allowed the State to terminate the cooperative’s contract entirely.63 
Economists John Powelson and Richard Stock argue that although the Reform freed 
peasants from serfdom of hacienda owners, it indebted them to the State in much the 
same way.64 Thus, the Reform merely shifted the power dynamics of land holdings 
from hacienda owners to the State, while peasant farmers remained largely ignored.  
 Soon after the culmination of Velasco’s military government in 1975, the APC’s 
began to break apart into individual holdings of about 6 hectares per family and 
continued to do so throughout the 1980s.65 Power dynamics of land shifted once again 
in the 1990s under neoliberal president Alberto Fujimori, who encouraged private 
ownership of land by eliminating the cap on maximum size of private land holdings 
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(which was previously 150 hectares).66 In short, the reform of 1969 removed land 
ownership from hacienda owners and gave the State more control over land allotments. 
Although the arrangement did not last, the dissolution of the cooperatives in the 1980s 
combined with neoliberal policies of the 1990s created an influx of private corporations 
looking to buy arable land. In turn, these private companies tended to cultivate export-
oriented crops in order to see a return on their capital-intensive investments in land.  
 
Land Distribution 
Newly irrigated land was first auctioned off to domestic and international 
bidders in 1997 and has since sold over 40,000 hectares.67 Yet despite Chavimochic’s 
goal to reduce rural poverty, smallholders have been largely excluded from purchasing 
new lands because, while the price of the land itself is not extraordinarily expensive, the 
buyer must assume a minimum investment per hectares in order to make the land not 
only productive, but efficient.68 Prices are set by state agency Promotion of Private 
Investment (PROINVERSIÓN) and vary depending on the plot’s location and access to 
water.69 The most recent auction occurred in 2008, though more are expected as phase 
III of Chavimochic opens up another 30,000 hectares in the Chicama valley.   
 Land in the traditional valleys has also been purchased by private companies, 
though not through auctions; rather, economics pressures and neoliberal policies have 
created an unequal playing field which has led many smallholders to sell their land. 
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Firstly, many of the cooperatives who could not repay their debts to the Banco 
Agropecuario de Fomento were foreclosed, and the land—rather than be redistributed 
among members of the cooperative as intended—was sold to private corporations.70 
Secondly, when the state-directed agrarian bank, Banco Agropecuario de Fomento, 
declared bankruptcy in 1990, farmers turned to private banks for the first time in twenty 
years (under the Agrarian Reform of 1969 property could not be mortgaged nor owned 
individually thus private banks stopped providing agricultural credit and instead the 
Banco Agropecuario de Fomento became the primary lender).71 Commercial banks, 
unlike the State-directed bank however, strongly favored industrial agriculturists who 
had capital or at least collateral.72 Only 15% of smallholders had received land titles by 
1990, which severely hindered their ability to access credit, and in turn, inhibited their 
ability to make their land productive.73 Although the Banco Agropecuario de Fomento 
has since recovered and begun re-lending to small farmers, a 2008 decree dissolved the 
maximum limit on private investments in the state-run Agro Banco. Previously, private 
investors could only control 49% of the capital, but this decree essentially opened the 
door to privatization of the state bank.74 While most analysts say that very few private 
investors would be interested in controlling the Agro Banco, the principle of it 
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eliminations competition and continues the trend of favoring only industrial 
agriculturists (and often transnational corporations) at the expense of small farmers.75  
In an effort to level the playing field and register the large number of extralegal 
landholders, a decree was issued in 1992 which created the Land Titling and Rural 
Registry (Spanish acronym PETT).76 As of 2012, the program has titled approximately 
55% of rural landholdings which has since increased property values for individuals and 
provided collateral.77 However, Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto argues that 
“most legal procedures to create formal property are not geared to process extralegal 
proofs of ownership that lack any visible chain of title—which, of course, is the only 
kind of proof the poor have.”78 Thus, even though land titling and reforms have been 
made with the goal of giving land to the rural poor, the process often undermines the 
goal.  Similarly, Carter and Salgado (2001) found that land titling programs on their 
own are insufficient instruments to equalize the playing field between smallholders and 
industrial agriculturists.79 For maximum results, they must be combined with other 
contemporary instruments for land reform such as market-assisted reform and 
grassroots movements.  
Granted, Chavimochic has improved the standard of living for thousands of 
people by providing jobs, potable water, and electricity—but it has done so within the 
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framework of existing power dynamics, thereby reproducing preexisting inequalities. 
The project is more than just a form of environmental regulation; it is an extension of 
contemporary land distribution policies which prioritize land holders (and, in turn, 
water users) based on socially constructed hierarchies. Thus, although Chavimochic 
aims to reduce rural poverty, some of the land distributive mechanisms it employs 
actually undermine the goal.   
 
2. Infrastructure 
In 2007, former president Alan García Pérez released a statement in which he 
expressed his support of large industrial agriculturists:  
“We have fallen in the trap of giving small lots of land to poor families with no 
money to invest, thus they come to the State to ask for fertilizer, seed, irrigation, 
and protected prices. This smallholder mode of production without technology is 
a vicious cycle of miserable poverty…If that same land sold, assembled into 
large plantations, this would draw technology and…make them productive with 
heavy investment and knowledge input from new buyers.”80 
 
According to the Peruvian Center for Social Studies (Spanish acronym CEPES), this 
statement was “anti-poor, anti-peasant, and anti-small farmer” because it encouraged 
the concentration of land holdings in the hands of the few despite the fact that land is 
often the primary resource for the rural poor.81 Granted, industrial agriculturists are able 
to produce more food on less land with less water, primarily because they are able to 
invest in time and energy saving mechanization, unlike small farmers without access to 
credit. As privatization of land increased  from 1986 to 2014, so too, did the yield of 
asparagus: from 4.5 tons per hectare to 13 tons per hectare, which is 188 percent 
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increase.82 Even compared to other major asparagus exporters globally, Peru’s yields 
are unprecedented at 1.5 times greater than their closest competitor, Mexico, and nearly 
4 times greater than the world average.83 
 Such high yields can be attributed, in part, to the scale of production and in part 
to irrigation type. Asparagus is one of Peru’s only crops to be drip irrigated—the 
majority of which is grown by private companies who have the capital to invest in the 
more expensive, but water saving, technology.84 Drip irrigation is 90 percent efficient, 
whereas gravity irrigation systems—which is primarily used in the traditional valleys by 
small farmers—have about 60 percent efficiency.85 Thus, since drip irrigation saves 
more water than gravity irrigation, industrial asparagus production is generally 
perceived to be highly efficient. The irony, however, is that asparagus is a far more 
water-intensive crop than many traditional products such as maize or alfalfa—for every 
100 grams of ready-to-eat asparagus, 93 grams is water—yet growing it in the desert of 
La Libertad, where the annual rainfall is only 152 millimeters a year, is somehow 
considered efficient.86 
The Water Law of 2009 prioritizes efficient water users above less efficient 
ones, though efficiency is not determined solely by quantity of water consumed; rather 
priority is given in the following order for productive uses: 1) those with the highest 
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efficiency; 2) those who generate the most employment; 3) and those who have the least 
environmental impact.87 Granted, the law prioritizes satisfying basic human needs 
above all else, followed by productive uses such as agriculture, mining, and energy 
generation, but clearly favors industrial agriculturists with high yields and job creation 
capacity.88 According to both the 1969 General Water Law (Ley General de Aguas) and 
the more recent 2009 Water Law (Ley de Recursos Hídricos), water in Peru is defined 
as a public good which is property of the State and cannot be privatized.89 In theory, all 
water users have equal access to water rights regardless of their economic capacity. 
However, critics of 2009 water law argue that its focus on promoting a “culture of 
efficiency” actually favors water users who can make capital-intensive investments on 
their land (industrial agriculturists, mining corporations, etc.) at the expense of water 
users who cannot (smallholders).90 Roa-García (2014) found that the 2009 Water Law 
and its 2010 revision mentioned efficiency 106 times, but did not use the terms equality 
or equity even once.91 
Efficiency of water is not determined by technology alone, but also by land 
holdings and access to credit which enables land holders to invest in modern water 
saving infrastructure. Yet access to land and credit is often a positive feedback loop: 
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without one or the other it is extremely difficult to acquire in the first place, thus 
excluding small farmers from gaining efficiency certifications and validating their right 
to water. The emphasis on efficiency, in general, has overshadowed issues of equity 
regarding water distribution as well as the distribution of benefits delivered by 
Chavimochic. Furthermore, the focus on irrigation mechanization has focused on 
percentage of water saved, rather than on how much water is actually used per crop.  
 
3. Labor  
1993 study by Marañón argued that the asparagus industry, which was originally 
targeted to reduce rural poverty, had actually increased it because of low salaries, short-
term and unstable employment contracts, and lack of social benefits.92 While this may 
have been true during the mid 1990s, the contemporary asparagus industry is not as 
easily reduced. In 2010, it was reported at the International Asparagus Congress in Peru 
that the asparagus industry provided 120,000 rural jobs, which has improved the quality 
of life for many people by providing basic necessities such as running water, electricity, 
and improved education.93 As of 2011, one hectare of asparagus generated, on average, 
210-215 labor days per year with an average daily wage of $5.5 USD—a typical 
agrarian salary in Peru.94 While daily and monthly wages for agrarian workers in Peru is 
debatably a livable wage, it is fairly average among countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean where the average daily salary for agrarian workers in 2002 was $3.95 
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USD.95 Yet labor laws have tended to favor employers over employees by keeping 
wages low. Additionally, even when labor laws include protections for workers, 
enforcement is often lax. 
Once of the most significant labor laws, the Law for the Promotion of the 
Agricultural Sector, was passed in 2000 by Fujimori in an effort to further promote 
efficiency and productivity. Essentially, the law created a separate set of labor laws for 
agrarian workers as compared to non-agrarian workers, which favored agroindustry 
employers by reducing labor costs.96 It was also around this time that auctions for new 
lands began to become more competitive as private investment increased in the region. 
While it did mandate an increase in the minimum daily wage to 4.95 USD (16 Nuevos 
Soles) and mandated overtime pay, it also weakened worker’s rights by: a) terminating 
workers yearly bonus by saying it was included in the increased daily wage; b) halving 
vacation time to 15 days for agrarian workers (as compared to 30 days for all non-
agrarian workers); c) reducing the amount agrarian workers’ pay into health insurance 
from 9% to 4%; d) limiting access to health insurance and social security to only 
workers who work for more than three consecutive months or 4 non-consecutive 
months within the calendar year; and d) increasing the flexibility of employee-employer 
contracts. Of all the changes, the last is arguably the most impactful, because it allows 
employers to dismiss or suspend workers at any time, creating a high level of job 
insecurity. As of 2012 there were 210,299 agroindustry workers signed to contracts of 
                                                      
95 Francisco García Pascual, "El Ajuste Estructural Neoliberal en el Sector Agrario 
Latinoamericano en la Era de la Globalización," Europa de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del 
Caribe 75, no. 1 (2003). 
96 El Congresso de la República and Presiente Fujimori, "Ley que Aprueba las Normas de 
Promoción Del Sector Agrario," N. 27360  (2000). 
 
 
28 
indeterminate amounts of time—all of which faced a high level of job insecurity.97 As 
one such worker expressed to La Republica newspaper in 2010, “I wanted to take out a 
loan and finish school, but in this line of work nobody feels safe. At any moment they 
could kick me to the curb.”98 
The law was originally set to expire in 2010, but because of its success in 
increasing private investments, it was extended until 2021. Over the course of the ten 
years during which the new law had been in place (2000-2010), the yield of asparagus 
produced per hectare increased by 1.36 times, suggesting that labor laws do have at 
least some level of impact on productivity, and ultimately, on private investments.99 The 
extension of the law, however, did not pass without backlash from workers, lawyers, 
and even government officials. In 2003, then President Toledo declared a state of 
emergency for thirty days when various workers, including those in the agricultural 
sector, went on strike and blocked vital highways in an effort to increase wages and 
decrease unfair taxation in the agriculture industry.100 Then in 2007, the College of 
Lawyers of Ica (Colegio de Abogados de Ica) argued in court that the Promotion of the 
Agricultural Sector was unconstitutional because it permitted the discrimination in the 
workplace by legalizing the payment of fewer social benefits to agro workers as 
compared to employees in other sectors.101 A year-long case ensued to determine the 
law’s constitutionality, during which the Director of Prevention and Solution of Labor 
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Conflicts and Social Responsibility within the Ministry of Labor, Enrique Fernández-
Maldonado Mujica, came out with a statement also condemning it as unconstitutional: 
“In Peru, labor discrimination has been legalized with the approval of a parallel 
(‘promotional’) labor regime in favor of private activity.”102 Nonetheless, in 2008, the 
courts ruled that the Promotion of the Agricultural Sector was constitutional, thus 
keeping it in place at least until 2021 when it will be reassessed.103  
On the whole, the Law is a direct manifestation of the ideological political shift 
from a state-controlled agriculture system with set prices, small, collectively owned 
farms, and one state-owned bank (Banco Agrario), to a neoliberal agricultural system 
based on private investments, large plots of land with modern technology, and a focus 
on high inputs and high outputs. This is not to say that the modernization of Peru’s 
agriculture system has only worsened working conditions—protective laws have been 
passed but actual enforcement of such laws is less known. For example, in 2002 
individual labor rights were enacted under the Law on Days of Work, Hours, and 
Overtime which set overtime regulations, maximum hours, and minimum age 
requirements. Small-scale improvements in labor rights continued in 2005 when the 
government established Regulations on Safety and Health in the Workplace, which 
recognized minimum safety requirements and put in place rights and responsibilities for 
employees and employers. Similarly, in 2003, collective labor rights were passed under 
Collective Labor Relations, which gave workers the right to collective association, 
bargaining, and the right to strike, which has been met with a some degrees of success. 
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In 1993, a study by Boris Marañon found that unions were virtually inexistent in La 
Libertad due to a variety of factors including fear of retribution by employers, lack of 
materials for organizing, lack of experience, and short employment times.104 Since then, 
unions have increased but have been met with varying degrees of success. For instance, 
when the employees of Agricola Virú formed a union in 2005 they received, as part of 
their employment, masks, gloves, and work clothes (however, only people in operations 
and sanitation have thus far received these benefits, though Agricola Virú says they plan 
to extend the benefits to field workers eventually).105 On the other end of the spectrum, 
Camposol was accused of unjustly and massively firing union workers in 2008.106 
Although the union busting was declared illegal by the 2003 Collective Labor 
Relations, the case is ongoing and was openly condemned in Europe’s Permanent 
People’s Tribunal (PPT), which is a non-legally binding watchdog organization for 
human rights.  
In total, Peru’s labor dynamics not only favor industrial producers, but they also 
influence water distribution. As previously discussed, Peru’s water law of 2009 
prioritizes efficient water users who generate employment and produce more food per 
hectare. Thus, despite the labor conditions, companies like Camposol have an upper 
hand in receiving access to water over small farmers who do not hire employees.  
 
                                                      
104 Marañón. 
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106 Wil Hout, EU Strategies on Governance Reform between Development and State-Building 
(New York, NY: Routledge, 2013); Elsa Chanduví Jaña, "A New Way to Violate Human 
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Discussion 
The evolution of land rights, water rights, labor laws, and international trade 
agreements has shifted Peru’s agricultural system from favoring the communal hacienda 
system and individual land holdings to favoring export-oriented industrial 
agriculturalists—which are often times transnational corporations. Despite the seeming 
difference between the two structures, marginalized groups actually remained the same 
in both situations: peasant farmers and the landless poor continue to be disregarded 
since they are not deemed “efficient” nor “productive” in the sense that agro exporters 
are.  
It is clear that politics plays a role in shaping water policies—whether it be as 
blatant as bribery or as subtle as biased labor laws—but the extent to which those 
policies exacerbate preexisting inequalities often depends on land holdings, 
infrastructure (e.g. type of irrigation), and labor supply. These factors are vital in 
understanding not only the equality of water distribution, but also the politics of drought 
globally—especially in the face of climate change. Peru’s specific case of irrigating a 
desert is actually quite common and the modes of thinking about water there can be 
transferred to most other arid and semi-arid regions of the world. For example, 
California’s drought from 2014-2017 can be better understood in terms of human 
consumption patterns if these factors are taken into consideration. Similarly, Iran’s 2001 
drought was the worst in recent history even though rainfall was not exceptionally low, 
thus causing many to rethink the drought in terms of mismanagement rather than 
environmental processes.107 Indonesia, too, has continued to face an inability to 
                                                      
107 Richard C. Foltz, "Iran's Water Crisis: Cultural, Political, and Ethical Dimensions," 
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 15, no. 4 (2002). 
 
 
32 
efficiently distribute water resources, and has turned to the partnerships with the private 
sector, which have been advocated as “pro-poor” water suppliers by creating new water 
distribution channels. 2007 study by Bakker, however, argues that quite the opposite 
occurs in practice: the private partnership preferentially targets middle and upper-
income households and ignored traditionally marginalized groups.108 Rethinking how 
land is distributed in this situation could actually improve water distribution by 
providing a more holistic understanding of water use.  
In short, the human forces which transformed Peru’s desert—like California’s—
into farmland cannot be overlooked, especially as pressure for water intensifies due to 
climate change and population growth. Our understanding of water availability needs to 
be decentered from hydrology in order to understand the more nuanced factors that 
shape the equality of water distribution. Additionally, the discourse of, and emphasis 
on, efficiency has placed too much faith in market-forces and overlooked traditional 
power dynamics, which in turn, are replicated in water distribution mechanisms, 
intentionally or unintentionally.  
                                                      
108 Karen Bakker, "Trickle Down? Private Sector Participation and the Pro-Poor Water Supply 
Debate in Jakarta, Indonesia," Geoforum 38, no. 5 (2007). 
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Chavimochic diverts water from the Santa River via the mother canal to 
irrigate the four northern valleys of Chao, Virú, Moche, and Chicama. “Etapa” I, II, and 
II correspond to the three phases of the project, of which phase III is still under 
construction. 
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Figure 2. Jorge Ramos Roncero, who received a total of $1.8 million in bribes from 
Odebrecht, went by the codename “Pescoção” which literally means “big throat” in 
Portuguese, but refers to someone who involves themselves in other people’s business.  
 
 
2014 Top Global 
Producers of 
Asparagus 
Production (tons) Yield 
(tons/hectare) 
Total hectares 
under cultivation 
#1 China 6,848,320 5.73 1,195,568 
#2 Peru 377,701 13.05 28,956 
#3 Mexico 170,225 9.18 18,543 
#4 Germany 114,090 6.24 18,269 
#5 Spain 48,814 5.32 9,175 
Figure 3. While China is the largest producer of asparagus, they consume 99% 
domestically, thus Peru is the largest exporter. Data compiled from FAOSTAT. 
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